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Reading Peter Bedford’s latest attack on the UK Gambling Commission, our Senior Journalist Viktor Kayed examines if the Mid Leicestershire MP’s pro-gambling arguments risk undermining the wider debate on gambling reform.
But on closer inspection, I began to question whether the hat fits. It certainly has a few holes that need stitching up.
Bedford argues that the Gambling Commission has spent decades failing to adequately fulfil its three statutory objectives: keeping gambling free from crime, ensuring that gambling is conducted fairly and openly, and protecting children and other vulnerable people from being harmed or exploited by gambling.
“Heavy and inconsistent regulation”, Bedford writes, “are the antithesis of this duty that puts the licensed market in jeopardy”.
There are legitimate reasons for the gambling industry to challenge the Commission’s approach. But this article focuses on the specific claims Bedford has made and whether the evidence supports them.
He makes three principal allegations: that the Commission is funding anti-gambling lobbying in breach of its own rules; that it is lobbying for higher gambling taxes in breach of its duties; and that it has developed a “dubious” survey that puts the rate of problem gambling at “nearly four times” that of its NHS counterpart, which he describes as the gold standard.
Let’s unpack each claim individually.
Commission funds anti-gambling lobbying
To put things into perspective, the Commission has historically required licensed operators to make financial contributions to approved organisations supporting gambling-harm research, prevention and treatment.
Since April 2025, this funding has been provided through the statutory levy.
And while funding research into gambling-related harm, funding public health organisations that advocate for policy change, and directly financing lobbying campaigns can overlap, they are certainly not interchangeable.
Perhaps the most substantial evidence behind Bedford’s criticism lies in an October 2026 commentary written by gambling analyst Dan Waugh, which alleged that over £95m in regulatory settlements between 2019-2025 included funding of organisations that advocate for stricter gambling regulation.
However, as it stands this is only commentary and not an independent audit. If Bedford wants to really hammer his point across, his accusations were better off being supported by directly identifying the organisations in question, the amount of funding, the specific lobbying, and the exact rule that the Commission breached.
Otherwise, claiming “anti-gambling lobbying” by itself risks confusing harm prevention with political campaigning – whether purposefully or not.
Commission is lobbying for increased gambling taxes
Again something that may look like a legitimate claim on the surface, but falls flat once you read between the lines.
The Commission did at one point advise the government that the Statutory Levy needs to be introduced, as there was evidence that the previous voluntary contribution model in place wasn’t financially sustainable – an opinion also shared by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee.
Subsequently, the levy was introduced in April 2025. And while it does represent a mandatory charge on licensed gambling operators, it is factually incorrect to label it as an increase in general gambling taxes.
The levy itself is not a tax, it is a mandatory version of the voluntary payments many operators were making to gambling treatment organisations for years prior to the Gambling Act review anyway.
What’s more, under the Gambling Act 2005 the Commission is granted a formal advisory role, which allows it to advise the government on gambling policy and legislation. Recommending that the levy be imposed is not evidence that it acted outside of its remit.
The levy itself was a decision made by the government, it wasn’t something singlehandedly imposed on operators by the Commission.
There could be a theoretical tension when exploring the question of whether the Commission essentially advocated for a policy that increased operators’ costs whilst simultaneously being required to avoid unnecessary burdens.
But Bedford again falls short of properly unpacking this, failing to provide any evidence or analysis of his own regarding which of its legal duties the Commission did violate, or even make a simple parallel between the necessary costs for regulation and harm prevention against the unnecessary ones.
Commission puts problem gambling rates at 4x higher than the NHS
This also might not be the home run that Bedford has imagined in his head. The Commission publishes the Gambling Survey for Great Britain (GSGB). The NHS has its own Health Survey for England (HSE).
Both surveys notably differ in methodology, questionnaire design and response collection.
It is worth noting that Bedford’s claims of overestimation are legitimately backed by concerns raised by the Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR), which in May 2025 did independently highlight a “non-negligible risk” that the GSGB survey might overestimate the true rates of gambling harm.
However, the OSR also did explicitly note that the GSGB and the HSE surveys should not be compared directly, and that the differences between them does not automatically mean that one survey is correct and the other is wrong.
On the fourfold figure, the 2025 GSGB survey indicated a problem gambling rate of 2.4%, while the HSE one from 2024 put it at less than 1% – both figures based on the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI).
And while the GSGB figure is notably higher, it is not a precise fourfold difference – if we are to ignore the Commission’s and the OSR’s warnings and compare both surveys directly.
A difference in the figures does not demonstrate that the Commission has intentionally designed the study to produce higher results. Without evidence of intent, calling the study “dubious” is nothing more than a personal belief.
Bedford seemingly finds this a whimsical decision. In his own words, “it doesn’t make sense” that the operator was penalised for not intervening when a customer won £260,000 and then lost £250,000 in 12 days, as they were still £10,000 in profit.
Another read of the above would be that operators should intervene when the player has demonstrably lost money overall. Why else would Bedford point to the net position?
And is the net position even relevant to whether the customer was at risk? While the spending does not conclusively prove that the customer had a gambling problem, high staking after a significant win is exactly what the Commission’s guidance suggests can contribute to harmful gambling.
The regulator did not find any records of safer gambling interactions with the customer in that period, which was among the failures identified by the Commission.
I’d also like to ask Mr Bedford something directly. I’d be interested to know whether you’d still feel like a winner after losing £250,000 in a week and a half, simply because you were £10,000 up overall. Surely the speed and scale of those losses matter more than whether the customer ended up marginally in profit?
Using my editorial liberties, I will use what Bedford says following his Rank comments as an imaginary answer to my question.
“The Commission clearly just doesn’t like big wins or big losses. Does it understand or care that punters who do aren’t simply going to stop gambling? The growth of the gambling black market might suggest not.”
And how exactly do we tackle the growth of the black market? Working with social media companies to remove illegal gambling promotions? We’ve tried that. Blocking access to illegal websites? We’re doing that too. Working with payment providers to disrupt transactions? That’s also part of the approach.
Yet your argument seems to imply that, because some punters will continue gambling regardless, licensed operators should simply let them do whatever they want. How does that solve the black market problem, exactly?
Commission leaves punters to “lump it”
Bedford further says that customers are not being protected when the Commission’s regulatory actions add to inflated commercial costs. He specifically argues that licence revocations can leave punters who lose money sitting in their accounts to liquidators to just ‘lump it’.
And while recovering funds from an operator that has lost its licence can be unnecessarily burdensome for customers, shouldn’t we also consider why the operator lost its licence in the first place?
Operators have a responsibility to comply with regulatory requirements, and the inconvenience caused by enforcement doesn’t, in itself, make that enforcement unjustified.
Final words
Reading Bedford’s comments has left me with one main takeaway, that I hope will resonate with you if you’ve reached this far.
We need critique of the Commission to be balanced, evidence-based and backed by solutions.
The regulator should be held accountable when it gets things wrong, but allegations of misconduct must be backed by solid arguments, not revolutionary rhetoric that risks undermining the principal regulatory authority responsible for keeping the sector on a stable footing.
Opinion: When flawed criticism clouds the UK gambling debate
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Reading Peter Bedford’s latest attack on the UK Gambling Commission, our Senior Journalist Viktor Kayed examines if the Mid Leicestershire MP’s pro-gambling arguments risk undermining the wider debate on gambling reform.
Rather than addressing why a 29-year-old like me might have to wait until 80 to retire, Bedford has chosen to throw his hat into the gambling reform debate.
But on closer inspection, I began to question whether the hat fits. It certainly has a few holes that need stitching up.
Bedford argues that the Gambling Commission has spent decades failing to adequately fulfil its three statutory objectives: keeping gambling free from crime, ensuring that gambling is conducted fairly and openly, and protecting children and other vulnerable people from being harmed or exploited by gambling.
“Heavy and inconsistent regulation”, Bedford writes, “are the antithesis of this duty that puts the licensed market in jeopardy”.
There are legitimate reasons for the gambling industry to challenge the Commission’s approach. But this article focuses on the specific claims Bedford has made and whether the evidence supports them.
He makes three principal allegations: that the Commission is funding anti-gambling lobbying in breach of its own rules; that it is lobbying for higher gambling taxes in breach of its duties; and that it has developed a “dubious” survey that puts the rate of problem gambling at “nearly four times” that of its NHS counterpart, which he describes as the gold standard.
Let’s unpack each claim individually.
Commission funds anti-gambling lobbying
To put things into perspective, the Commission has historically required licensed operators to make financial contributions to approved organisations supporting gambling-harm research, prevention and treatment.
Since April 2025, this funding has been provided through the statutory levy.
And while funding research into gambling-related harm, funding public health organisations that advocate for policy change, and directly financing lobbying campaigns can overlap, they are certainly not interchangeable.
Perhaps the most substantial evidence behind Bedford’s criticism lies in an October 2026 commentary written by gambling analyst Dan Waugh, which alleged that over £95m in regulatory settlements between 2019-2025 included funding of organisations that advocate for stricter gambling regulation.
However, as it stands this is only commentary and not an independent audit. If Bedford wants to really hammer his point across, his accusations were better off being supported by directly identifying the organisations in question, the amount of funding, the specific lobbying, and the exact rule that the Commission breached.
Otherwise, claiming “anti-gambling lobbying” by itself risks confusing harm prevention with political campaigning – whether purposefully or not.
Commission is lobbying for increased gambling taxes
Again something that may look like a legitimate claim on the surface, but falls flat once you read between the lines.
The Commission did at one point advise the government that the Statutory Levy needs to be introduced, as there was evidence that the previous voluntary contribution model in place wasn’t financially sustainable – an opinion also shared by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee.
Subsequently, the levy was introduced in April 2025. And while it does represent a mandatory charge on licensed gambling operators, it is factually incorrect to label it as an increase in general gambling taxes.
The levy itself is not a tax, it is a mandatory version of the voluntary payments many operators were making to gambling treatment organisations for years prior to the Gambling Act review anyway.
What’s more, under the Gambling Act 2005 the Commission is granted a formal advisory role, which allows it to advise the government on gambling policy and legislation. Recommending that the levy be imposed is not evidence that it acted outside of its remit.
The levy itself was a decision made by the government, it wasn’t something singlehandedly imposed on operators by the Commission.
There could be a theoretical tension when exploring the question of whether the Commission essentially advocated for a policy that increased operators’ costs whilst simultaneously being required to avoid unnecessary burdens.
But Bedford again falls short of properly unpacking this, failing to provide any evidence or analysis of his own regarding which of its legal duties the Commission did violate, or even make a simple parallel between the necessary costs for regulation and harm prevention against the unnecessary ones.
Commission puts problem gambling rates at 4x higher than the NHS
This also might not be the home run that Bedford has imagined in his head. The Commission publishes the Gambling Survey for Great Britain (GSGB). The NHS has its own Health Survey for England (HSE).
Both surveys notably differ in methodology, questionnaire design and response collection.
It is worth noting that Bedford’s claims of overestimation are legitimately backed by concerns raised by the Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR), which in May 2025 did independently highlight a “non-negligible risk” that the GSGB survey might overestimate the true rates of gambling harm.
However, the OSR also did explicitly note that the GSGB and the HSE surveys should not be compared directly, and that the differences between them does not automatically mean that one survey is correct and the other is wrong.
On the fourfold figure, the 2025 GSGB survey indicated a problem gambling rate of 2.4%, while the HSE one from 2024 put it at less than 1% – both figures based on the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI).
And while the GSGB figure is notably higher, it is not a precise fourfold difference – if we are to ignore the Commission’s and the OSR’s warnings and compare both surveys directly.
A difference in the figures does not demonstrate that the Commission has intentionally designed the study to produce higher results. Without evidence of intent, calling the study “dubious” is nothing more than a personal belief.
Rank Casino’s penalty “surely doesn’t make sense”
Rank Group was recently handed a £5m penalty by the Commission over AML and social responsibility failures.
Bedford seemingly finds this a whimsical decision. In his own words, “it doesn’t make sense” that the operator was penalised for not intervening when a customer won £260,000 and then lost £250,000 in 12 days, as they were still £10,000 in profit.
Another read of the above would be that operators should intervene when the player has demonstrably lost money overall. Why else would Bedford point to the net position?
And is the net position even relevant to whether the customer was at risk? While the spending does not conclusively prove that the customer had a gambling problem, high staking after a significant win is exactly what the Commission’s guidance suggests can contribute to harmful gambling.
The regulator did not find any records of safer gambling interactions with the customer in that period, which was among the failures identified by the Commission.
I’d also like to ask Mr Bedford something directly. I’d be interested to know whether you’d still feel like a winner after losing £250,000 in a week and a half, simply because you were £10,000 up overall. Surely the speed and scale of those losses matter more than whether the customer ended up marginally in profit?
Using my editorial liberties, I will use what Bedford says following his Rank comments as an imaginary answer to my question.
“The Commission clearly just doesn’t like big wins or big losses. Does it understand or care that punters who do aren’t simply going to stop gambling? The growth of the gambling black market might suggest not.”
And how exactly do we tackle the growth of the black market? Working with social media companies to remove illegal gambling promotions? We’ve tried that. Blocking access to illegal websites? We’re doing that too. Working with payment providers to disrupt transactions? That’s also part of the approach.
Yet your argument seems to imply that, because some punters will continue gambling regardless, licensed operators should simply let them do whatever they want. How does that solve the black market problem, exactly?
Commission leaves punters to “lump it”
Bedford further says that customers are not being protected when the Commission’s regulatory actions add to inflated commercial costs. He specifically argues that licence revocations can leave punters who lose money sitting in their accounts to liquidators to just ‘lump it’.
And while recovering funds from an operator that has lost its licence can be unnecessarily burdensome for customers, shouldn’t we also consider why the operator lost its licence in the first place?
Operators have a responsibility to comply with regulatory requirements, and the inconvenience caused by enforcement doesn’t, in itself, make that enforcement unjustified.
Final words
Reading Bedford’s comments has left me with one main takeaway, that I hope will resonate with you if you’ve reached this far.
We need critique of the Commission to be balanced, evidence-based and backed by solutions.
The regulator should be held accountable when it gets things wrong, but allegations of misconduct must be backed by solid arguments, not revolutionary rhetoric that risks undermining the principal regulatory authority responsible for keeping the sector on a stable footing.